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REFORM

POINT
by Andrew F.Popper
-ror to 1965, product liability
cases were relatively rare. Section 402(a) of the Second Restatement
had not yet been adopted, and consumers had low expectations regarding the utility of tort litigation. In
part, this was due to an advertising
campaign on the part of producers to
convince consumers that product related accidents were the fault of consumers. In the famous "Willie Tinker"
commercial, a small cartoon figure
suggested to consumers that, if only
they would be more careful, fewer
accidents would occur. Social expectations regarding the legitimacy of
corporate decisionmaking were high;
a public trust was placed in our corporate system. Because they were
good for America, corporations were
to be believed. Accordingly, courts
were highly protective of corporate
interests.
From 1965 forward, the game
changed with the state-by-state adoption of §402(a) allowing victims in
product-related accidents to use the
cour, system to accomplish consumer
protection goals. A small number of
large verdict cases involving asbestos
and similar high-risk products have
generated significant consumer protection benefits. It is no secret that the
manufacturing and insurance communities would now like to turn back the
dock.
Approximately ten years ago, those
seeking fundamental change in the
tort system latched on to the ph-ase
"tort reform" to describe legislative
and judicial initiatives designed to
minimize the potential liability of in-
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surers and manufacturers. The selection of the term "tort reform" reflects
true genius in terms of public relations. It provides a positive and populist image to a profoundly pro-corporate and anti-consumer initiative.
Of the many millions of consumers
injured by products each year, only a
tiny number succeed in product liability actions. For the few who seek legal
redress, there are numerous hurdles.
Nonetheless, reformers have fostered a
perception that consumers win an
endless number of outrageous cases.
Some years ago on a hot summer
night an infant put to bed for the
evening in his crib wriggled in his
sleep until his feet stuck between two
slats of his crib. He twisted and wriggled further, and his abdomen and
chest also slid through those two slats.
The final wriggle, and his shoulders
moved through the same area, but his
head was larger than the opening; the
next morning his parents found him
hanging-dead from his crib.
Turn on your LEXIS machines and
check the caselaw, and you will not
find this case. A lack of negligence and
a finding of "no defect" under 402(a)
blocked the plaintiffs from prevailing
in this case. A plaintiff-oriented tort
system "out of control" would have
awarded damages in this setting if
sympathy had replaced logic.
Arguments about "tort reform",
however, often begin with industry
representatives telling, almost tonguein-cheek, about outrageous, "wacky"
cases. Speech after speech begins with
the tale of the psychic -who won a
multi-million dollar verdict after she
claimed that a CAT-scan had destroyed her psychic powers or the
story about the burglar who fell
through a skylight, brought suit, and
the building owner was ordered to
pay millions of dollars. These anec-

dotes are usually mythical or are about
judgments that were reversed. Such
stories do not justify passing legislation that reduces the potential for injured persons to seek and receive redress for their injuries.
There is a need for legislation, although it is not based on the misfortunes of the insurance or manufacturing communities in the United States.
Instead, it is based on the simple need
for health and safety that is threatened
by unsafe products, unsafe drugs, unsafe toys, unsafe food, unsafe chemicals, and abusive unregulated insurance companies.
The tort reformers have an agenda.
It has been developed carefully over
the last ten years. At the outset one
might have argued that the reformer's
goal was to make the process of personal injury litigation more efficient.
Today it is clear that the goal of tort reform is to reduce the potential of injured persons to succeed in personal
injury cases, limit the amount of
money negligent manufacturers are
obligated to pay for the harm their
products cause, reduce the risk insurance companies face so that they can
compound their alread,- obscene profits, and limit the exposure to punitive
damages for manufactuers or others
who have engaged in intentional misconduct.
Much the same as the "Willie Tmker" campaign of the 1950s, tort-reform advertising is designed to convince the American public that the
agenda for tort reform serves the consumer. The advertising seeks to create
an image of a tort system in which unworthy plaintiffs are lucky winners of
a bizarre lottery who, on a regular
basis, walk away from courthouses
with millions in their pockets and
smiles on their faces. This unjust enrichment, so goes the advertisement,

(9) Exclude as a matter of law in
can only be stopped if state legislators,
members of Congress, judges, and every state evidence of subsequent rejuries all become convinced of the medial measures.
(10) Never allow a plaintiff to collect
"fraud" which plaintiffs and their
lawyers are perpetrating on the punitive damages, but instead have
such damages pour over into a "state
system.
The appropriate response to this purpose" trust.
(11) Compel plaintiffs to engage in
purported misallocation of resources
is to change basic tort law. Over the arbitration prior to the initiation of any
last decade, the tort reformers have personal injury case, and create the
sought to modify legal doctrine by risk of a heavy penalty for plaintiffs
putting forward legislation in line who opt out of an arbitration system.
with the reforms agenda. The pro(12) Expand and enrich the learned
posed legislation and some of its con- intermediary defense, relieving doctors of the obligation to inform pasequences include:
(1)In tort cases where punitive dam- tients of the risks of pharmaceutical
ages are justified because of serious products or treatments.
misconduct, only the first plaintiff fil- It does not take too much scrutiny to
ing the lawsuit should rec-ive puni- realize that those legislative proposals
tive damages. Thus, all others-re- do not reflect the agenda of a group ingardless of the circumstances of their dined to protect the consumer.
injury-will receive only compenHow does this agenda play out in
Maryland? To say that Maryland has
satory damages.
(2) Punitive damages should be done nothing stunning regarding its
capped. Thus, manufacturers who tort system is not to insult state legislaproduce defective products can calcu- tors or the judges who have created
late their exposure to punitive losses the system, but rather to suggest that
and breed that exposure into the price the state has proceeded carefully and
not undergone significant changes by
of the products they sell.
(3) Joint and several liability should virtue of the tort reform movement,
be modified or abolished. Thus, those save one.
who engage in intentional or negligent
In 1986 Maryland passed a "cap"
misconduct will have their liability law. The Courts and Judicial Proceedlimited, and plaintiffs will have to pur- ings article, section 11-108, and 11-109,
sue every potential defendant.
places a $350,000 limit on noneco(4) Strict liability should be elimi- nomic damages, or pain and suffering,
nated for product sellers. Thus, those for all causes of action that arise after
who profit the most from the sale of a July 1, 1986. The limitation does not
product, retailers, are able to avoid lia- apply to economic or punitive dambility when that product malfunctions. ages. Jurors are not advised of this lim(5) In order to receive punitive dam- itation, and jury awards that exceed
ages, a plaintiff should demonstrate
is sum must be reduced to conform
conscious and flagrant disregard on with the limit. The Maryland Court of
the part of a defendant. Thus, a stan- Special Appeals affirmed the constitudard that is harsher than "intent" in tionality of this limitation on recovery
criminal cases would be imposed on in Edmonds v. Murphy, 83 Md. App.
the victim of corporate negligence.
133, 573 A.2d 853, cert. granted, 321
(6) Change negligence law in each Md. 46, 580 A.2d 1066 (1990). Alstate so that to prove manufacturers' though it is certainly consistent with
liability would require a showing that the basic theme of the tort reform
the harm that occurred could have agenda, the inapplicability of the limibeen "reasonably anticipated" as op- tation to punitive or compensatory
posed to "foreseeable." Thus, again, damages makes this a rather moderate
the victim's burden of proof becomes tort reform action.
all but provable.
Several other parts of Maryland law
(7) Make "state of the art" an abso- are in line with some of the tenets of
lute defense in any product liability the tort reform agenda. Maryland law,
case.
section 80-913 of the Courts and Judi(8) Any manufacturer who complies cial Proceedings article, does not allow
with a government standard should the topic of the wealth of the defenhave no exposure or limited liability dant to get to a jury until a finding of
for punitive damages, particularly liability has been made in a punitive
in the food and drug and airline damage case. This, however, seems to
businesses.
be the best way to deal with the ques-

tion of the wealth of the defendant.
Exxon v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516
A.2d 990 (1986), holds that the defendants may not be held jointly and
severally liable for punitive damages,
lessening the opportunity of plaintiffs
to collect punitive damages should
one of several joint tortfeasors be judgment-proof.
In Montgomery County v. Valk, 317
Md. 185, 562 A.2d 1246 (1989), the
court reiterates that the doctrine of
contributory negligence was alive and
well in Maryland, but it also concluded that contributory negligence
would not bar a case brought under
section 402(a).
On the other hand, Maryland does
utilize a consumer-oriented approach
regarding the date of discovery of injury rule for the statute of limitation.
Maryland was one of the first states to
expand the use of the discovery rule to
almost all types of personal liability
cases.
More recent legislative activity in the
state of Maryland regarding the tort
field has been something short of phenomenal. Although a number of bills
have been introduced, few have
passed, and none-except the "cap"have had a significant impact on the
tort system. Nothing has been proposed in Maryland on the order of
magnitude of the federal bills.
Last fall the United States Senate
considered S.1400, a bill resubmitted
for the Spring 1991 Session as S.640. It
provides benefits for defendants and
would change basic jurisprudential
principles in every state, creating "federal tort law" in areas reserved historically to the states.
The current proposed federal product liability bill is rather moderate. It
would modify joint and several liability,enhance the government standards
defenses, and mandate the use of clear
and convincing evidence as a standard
for punitive damages. Although these
are modest proposals, legislation that
preempts state tort law and establishes
a federal tort system is not to be taken
lightly. Should the Congress pass this
bill, you will see in future quiet sessions of various congressional committees, attracting nowhere near the
amount of attention given to the first
product liability bill, the federalization
of tort law and the disassembly of consumer protection that flows from the
existence of the tort system. The simple fact is that there is no justification
for a federal tort law.
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We do not have a national crisis
needing federal attention. Indeed, a recent American Bar Foundation shidy
concludes that, based on an evaluation
of 25,000 jury verdicts, there is no
punitive damage crisis. (Daniels &
Martin, Myth and Reality In Punitive
Damages, ABF Working Paper 8911,
Am. Bar Found. 63 (1990).) Two GAO
reports conclude that there is no explosion in the product liability litigation
field, and certainly no explosion relating to compensatory damages. An
identical conclusion is reached by Professors Henderson and Eisenberg in
'"he Quiet Revolution in Product Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change," 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 479, 480

(1990).
Yet, reformers agree that the current
system radically impairs the competitive posture of domestic businesses in
international markets. It is incredible,
however, to assert that a system that
condemns defective products or products and services produced in a negligent or grossly negligent manner
is destructive of our competitive
posture. There is no market for defective goods.
A recent OTA study on competitiveness evaluated four factors needed to
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improve the posture of American businesses in international markets. Notably, modification of product liability
law, t 'e law pertaining to punitive
damages or other components of the
proposed federal bills, was not within
that recommendation. Although it
may be tempting to pin these problems on product liability law, the evidence is simply not there.
A companion invalid justification
for reform, inlduding federal reform,
involves the diversion of assets away
from research and development. The
argument goes like this: so much
money is spent on tort cases that there
is nothing left for research. There is,
however, only a miniscule level of real
dollar loss from compensatory or
punitive damages. Moreover, the vast
majority of punitive damage awards
do not involve consumer goods;
rather, they involve personal violence,
false arrest, malicious behavior, or intentional misconduct.
The final justification for this destruction of federal/state relations involves the desire to establish a uniform tort system. First, and more
fundamental, the very nature of the
United States suggests that uniform
state law is not and should not be a
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dominant federal objective. Second,
each of the federal bills establishes diverse standards for liability and ultimately discriminates between defendants in product liability cases and
defendants in other cases. The bills are
written in such a way that they require
state courts to do extensive interpretation, giving lawyers and law professors much to work on, but hardly creathig uniformity.
In short, a federally imposed system
of tort reform will not work and is not
needed. Indeed, it appears that the
Supreme Court has lost interest in the
tort reform agenda, rejecting tort reformers' arguments in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance v. Haslip, Docket No. 891279, argued October 8, 1990, decided
March 4, 1991, Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., - U.S. - (1989), 109 S. CL 2909
(1989), and Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
Congress should do the same. Moreover, Maryland should maintain its
"go slow" approach to tort reform.
Maryland legislators should be wary
of tort reformers in sheep's clothing:
the true agenda for tort reform is nothing that will benefit the citizens of this
state. U
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industry have earned them. They stand
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